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Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16 (May 12, 2011)1
FAMILY LAW – SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Summary
Petition for rehearing of an appeal from default judgment stemming from a property
dispute ordered by the Family Court Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court. Rehearing
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure of a party to provide adequate notice of
intent to seek a default judgment.
Disposition/Outcome
The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the family court judge did have subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, even though it was outside of the scope of a traditional family court.
The Court then reversed the default judgment because Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant with
proper notice of intent to seek a default after giving Defendant several extensions to file an
answer.
Factual and Procedural History
Amit Malik (“Malik”) and Dlynn Landreth (“Landreth”) cohabitated together from July
2001 until September 2005. The parties were never married and did not have any children
together during the course of their four-year relationship. In September 2006, a year after the
parties ended their relationship, Malik filed an action against Landreth in the family court
division, seeking half of the equity in a Las Vegas home, half of certain personal property
acquired during the relationship, and all of his separate property.
Malik properly served Landreth with the complaint in early October 2006. During
October and November, Malik granted several oral and written time extensions for Landreth to
file an answer. Because Landreth failed to answer, even after the extensions, Malik filed a notice
of intent to apply for a default judgment in December. In February 2007, Malik filed the default
and served Landreth with notice of a default hearing.
During the hearing, Landreth moved to set aside default by alleging Malik granted her an
additional time extension after the December notice of intent to apply for default judgment.
Reasoning that Landreth had numerous opportunities to answer, the family court granted default
judgment to Malik and awarded him half the equity in the home and other personal property
located within the residence.
Landreth appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Nevada on the previously unargued basis of improper subject matter jurisdiction. Writing for the majority, the Court found
that the family court’s judgment was void because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For
this rehearing, Landreth asks the Court to re-consider the subject matter jurisdiction issue. She
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also asserts that the family court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Landreth’s
notice argument.
Discussion
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Writing for the majority, Justice Hardesty made a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. More specifically, the question was whether a family
court judge has the judicial power to hear matters outside of the scope of family court issues, as
enumerated by statute.
Landreth’s argument was that her case did not fall within family court subject matter
jurisdiction under NRS 3.223 because the parties were not married, had no children, and the only
issue was property distribution.2 As in Landreth’s first appeal,3 the Court determined that the first
step in the analysis was to analyze Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution.4 In parting
with the analysis in the first appeal, the Court concluded that Article 6, Section 6 is ambiguous
because it could reasonably be interpreted in two different ways. First, it could be interpreted to
allow the Legislature to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of family court. But it could also be
interpreted to mean that judges sitting in family court have the same powers as other district
court judges, which would include the power to hear matters outside of the ones listed in NRS
3.223.5 Thus, the Court looked at legislative history for support.
From the legislative history, the majority concluded that a family court judge had the
same power as any other district court judge.6 The Court then looked at the legislative history of
NRS 3.223.7 There, the Court found that family court judges must first run as district court
judges and then rotate into the position of a family court judge. The Court distinguished this
from other states where a judge is only a family court judge, and not first a district court judge.
The Court also cited to several hearings where senators expressed much concern about limiting
the jurisdiction of family court judges.
After parsing the history of NRS 3.223, the majority concluded that NRS 3.223 in no way
limits the constitutional power and authority granted under Article 6, Section 6(1) to district
court judges sitting in family court.8 The Court explained that judicial power of judges is derived
directly from the Nevada Constitution, but the subject matter jurisdiction of family court is
ultimately established under NRS 3.223. And even though that statute details that family court
has original jurisdiction over certain matters, a district court judge’s judicial power is not
diminished by NRS 3.223. Thus, district court judges presiding in family court may hear matters
unrelated to family court. However, the majority was quick to note that this would be rare – only
in situations where a case was miss-assigned to family court would this likely occur.
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Abuse of Discretion
Because the Court determined that family court did have jurisdiction over the matter, it
next turned to the issue of whether the family court abused its discretion regarding the entry of
default judgment. The Court concluded that family court did abuse its discretion and reversed.
Landreth argued for a reversal because Malik did not send a second notice of intent to file
a default after granting Landreth extensions for her to file an answer. Malik, on the other hand,
argues that there is no further notice requirement after he provided Landreth with the first one.
The Court started its analysis first by distinguishing the notice requirements for a default versus
the requirements for a default judgment. Relying on Rowland v. Lepire,9 the Court explained that
a lawyer has a duty to determine intent to proceed before requesting a default. Looking to NRCP
55(b)(2),10 the Court explained that there is a three-day notice requirement before a party can
request a default judgment.
Turning to the facts, the Court noted that Malik did send a three-day notice of intent to
file a default judgment, but he did so before a default was even entered by the court. Thus, Malik
failed to provide notice consistent with NRCP 55(b)(2) – the three-day notice of intent to seek a
default judgment must occur after the clerk has registered the default.11 Additionally, the Court
also found that, under Rowland, Malik also had a duty to inquire about Landreth’s intent to
proceed after each extension he granted her. Malik stated on the record that he verbally granted
Landreth several extensions, but he did not ask whether she intended to proceed. Thus, Malik
failed to provide adequate notice under either Rowland or NRCP 55(b)(2). Consequently, the
court abused its discretion when it failed to consider this issue.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Pickering and Justice Cherry joined, dissented and
would deny the petition for rehearing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Douglas’ dissent
echoed much of the same analysis he used in writing the majority opinion in the original appeal.
He argued that a judge’s power is not personal, but is institutional. Thus, it is a court that has
jurisdiction over and matter and not a specific judge. But if a court does not have jurisdiction,
then no judge can proceed. Justice Douglas cited to several cases stating similar opinions as
support for his statements.12
Justice Douglas went on to argue that NRS 3.223 did in fact create original jurisdiction
for family courts and without such jurisdiction, family court cannot hear matters other than those
enumerated in the statute.13 He further concluded that family court should hear matters outside
the scope of NRS 3.223 only if the matter was in some way related to matters listed in the statute.
Otherwise, family court judges would be forced to hear everything from murder to construction
defect cases.
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The dissenters did not agree that Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution was
ambiguous.14 They thought it was simple – family-related matters fall under the jurisdiction of
family court.15 Justice Douglas also argued that under the majority’s rationale, district court
judges not assigned to family court had less authority than those assigned to family court, which
would violate the constitution. Continuing, he explained that if all district court judges were
vested with equal jurisdictional powers, then it also followed that district court judges in districts
with family courts should have the power to hear family law-related matters, even if they were
not assigned to family court. Thus, the whole idea that family courts have original jurisdiction
over family law matters would be meaningless.
Justice Cherry added a separate dissent, stating his concerns that family court was created
for the sole purpose of hearing family-related matters. The public did not intend that family court
judges should have to hear construction defect or business cases. Justice Cherry also stated that
he thought the majority has misapplied the legislative history surrounding the creation of family
court.
Conclusion
A family court judge maintains all constitutional powers of a district court judge. Thus,
family court judges possess the judicial power to hear matters outside of the scope of family
court’s domain. Additionally, a party must provide notice of intent to seek a default in
accordance with NRCP 55(b)(2) even after granting extensions to file an answer.
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